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Delivered at Annual Meeting Canadian Bar Associa-
tion, at Ottawa, September .st, 1.920.
Mr. Chairman, Your Excellency, Lord Cave and
the Political Hierarchy of Canada, together with that
association of gentlemen whom I now have the honour
of addressing, upon whom and upon whose advi~e and
strength and force of character they all rely-the
members of the Canadian Bar Association:
I thank you for this welcome. It is a pleasure to
come here, in spite of the fact that Sir James Aikins
has imposed on me the duty of speaking-something
in which I have had very little practice. I am hon-
oured by the presence of the representative of the
Crown here, the Duke of Devonshire, whose kind
hospitality I am enjoying. It has been a great pleas-
ure to meet my fellow guests, the Privy Councillor
Lord Cave and the American Ambassador-or at least
the British Ambassador to America.
When I come here I cannot help feeling as if I was
in at the birth of this Canadian Bar Association. I
remember well, as doubtless many of you do, that
great meeting of the American Bar Association at
Montreal, and the very beautiful address of Lord
Haldane, who'was the guest of the Association on that
occasion. I remember his discourse on Sittleichkeit
and Gemuthleichkeit in 1913, which did not immedi-
ately appear as the controlling influence in the world
within the year following. (Laughter.) But it was a
beautiful address and it had a truth in it that must
not be lost, and that was that the union of nations for
the good of the world must depend upon their spirit
of co-operation and their kindly feeling to one another,
as the indispensable basis of any improvement in
C.L.T.---66
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international matters and in the organization of any
successful union of the forces of the world to preserve
peace. I am glad to know that the Canadian Bar
Association, which I hope I am not wrong in saying
had the suggestion of its organization from that meet-
ing, has attained the strength and usefulness which
this meeting and the previous meetings have
developed.
' I am here, I am glad to say, as the representative
of the American Bar Association to express to you
our fraternal feeling and our congratulation upon
your successful organization and life. Mr. Hampton
Carson, the President of that Association, asked me
to come; and your President was good enough to press
me to come, with an incidental reference to "a word
or two" which he said he would be glad to have from
me. Having had some experience of that kind of
invitation, however, I was not surprised to find that
I was to be given'a full afternoon for a formal address.
I can only be thankful that it was not called an ora-
tion. Ordinarily in our country that is what it is
called.
What can a man do, thus invited, responding to an
obligation to come, seeking a vacation, without a
secretary, when he is asked to make an address ? Well,
I turn always when I am in doubt as to what the pro-
fessional duty of a lawyer is, to the professional ethics
of the profession of clergyman; and when they are
away on a vacation and called upon to discharge their
professional functions, they turn the barrel up and they
proceed to visit upon their temporary auditors ser-
mons which are good because they have used them so
often. (Laughter.) Therefore it is that in selecting.
the text for my remarks I am going to say something
about what you may have heard of before, and what I
certainly have heard of before. A text here should be
legal; it should be something having the professional
cast; and something of common interest. Now, I am
sure the League of Nations has common interest;
whether it has common agreement or not, it has com-
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mon interest for us all, and if I can limit my discussion
to the legal aspects from the standpoint of one coun-
try, perhaps it is not inappropriate that I should
extend my remarks along that line.
I was delighted with the ceremonies and the
speeches this morning-His Excellency 's address and
that of your President, Sir James Aikins. I was
delighted both because of the intrinsic merit of what
was said, and also because misery loves company, to
know that you too are not without your constitutional
difficulties, that you too are constantly engaged, per-
haps not so much as we, but nevertheless that you have
questions as to your fundamental law and what it
really means; and you have that advantage that we
all have of making it mean, when you are construing
it, -% hat suits you. Now, we have in our country, I
fancy, more discussion of constitutional questions than
any other country in the world. When I say "con-
stitutional questions" I do not mean the discussion
of such a thing as the British Constitution, which is
unwritten and which is certainly not the construction
of an exact document. But we began with a written
constitution; we began with differences that were
avoided by an instrument to which the different sides
gave different constructions, and ever since the foun-
dation of our government our politics have been
largely, not altogether, but in a greater measure than
in any other country, a discussion of what our funda-
mental law means. The question of the division of
power between the States and the Central Govern-
ment, the question of slavery, which was mentioned in
the constitution, and which ultimately led to the Civil
War, all tended to make every political issue savour
something of constitutional construction. It is to
that side of the League of Nations that I would like to
invite your attention. I mean by that side the con-
struction of the League of Nationg from the stand-
point of the federal constitution of the United States,
and the question whether the League of Nations, as
submitted to the Senate of the United States, is in
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violation of any of the provisions of the constitution
of that country.
We of course inherit from you this character of
question, because I presume the written constitution
of the United States was suggested by our relations to
the Mother Country. The powers to be exercised by a
dependent government under a charter of that govern-
ment, with a sovereign or with a court of a sovereign
to pass on the question whether that charter has been
violated or not, suggested what has followed in the
United States. It was extended in this wise. The
United States is an independent sovereign govern-
ment with three branches, the legislative, executive
and judicial branches, somewhat more rigidly sepa-
rated than are those branches in your government.
They are co-ordinate branches. Who, then, is to
determine whether each branch keeps within its limi-
tations? The court was forced into the position, in
the litigation of private rights and in its obligation
to declare the law, of having to pass on the validity of
the action of the legislative and executive branches,
even though they were co-ordinate branches. Of
course that duty is limited by the possibility of raising
the question in a litigated case where the court must
act and declare the law accordingly.
So it is that we have had in our country lawyers
who were constitutional lawyers-and, I have thought,
a good many who were unconstitutional lawyers.
Therefore, even though this may seem solemn and
narrowly professional, it would not seem so at home.
When you wish to dignify a man at home among his
clients, not so much among his fellows at the bar or
with the court, you call him a "con-sti-tu-tional"
lawyer. There is something about that name that so
fills the mouth that it carries dignity with its very
expression.
Now,, you must be interested as lawyers and as
leaders of political thought in Canada in what the
powers of the United States are as a neighbour in
making treaties. That is the question that I want to
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discuss to-day. You must be interested to know how
far we can go, and how far you can go in entering into
contracts with us and be sure that when the contracts
come to be enforced we cannot plead that we were act-
ing ultra vires.
The treaty-making power is entrusted, in our con-
stitution, to the President and it is resided in the
executive power:
" The President shall make treaties by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate "-
two-thirds of those present. The Senate is the body,
w( say, that represents the States. It is a body whose
membership cannot, by the terms of the constitution,
ever be changed. Each state is entitled to two repre-
sentatives; and that is the only provision in the con-
stitution now that is not the subject of amendment.
And this requires that those who are selected by the
States-two-thirds of them-shall ratify any contract
or treaty that we may make with other countries.
Congress is not the treaty-making power; it is the
law-making power.
Now you ask-and I refer to this because it seems
to.arouse some interest when it is referred to: How
did we make the Reciprocity Treaty-or propose to
make it? (Laughter.) Well, that arose in this wise. It
was not a treaty. We had an informal agreement, but it
was not a treaty that we made at all. Each govern-
ment agreed, through its legislative branch, infor-
mally to pass a law. The law of the United States
was that tariff rates with Canada should be at a cer-
tain figure whenever Canada should pass a law of a
similar character. Each could retreat from that at
any station at all. There was no obligation to con-
tinue it; there was no promise to continue it. It was
a case where the law on one side was made to be
dependent on the operation of the law on the other.
It was, if you choose to call it so, a meeting of minds,
which could be withdrawn from at will, but it was not
a promissory agreement in the sense of contracting to
do something in the future.
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It is proposed-indeed there was a resolution by
which Congress is to declare peace in the present con-
tingency. It inay declare peace; and if the country
with whom the peace is to be established declares it
also, there is a meeting of the minds and peace is cre-
ated-the status of war is changed by that declara-
tion. Or it may operate in a different way. There
may be actual peace. International lawyers recognize
that peace can come without a treaty or a definite
agreement, by the acquiescence en paix of both sides;
and such a declaration of Congress would be an
authoritative recognition, an additional evidence of
the existence of that status that had come about en
paix by the ceasing to fight and by acquiescence in a
state of peace. But that is not promissory; that is
only changing a status, and when the status is changed
the thing is accomplished, a fait accompli, and there-
fore it is not in the nature of a contract for something
in the future binding on Congress, because one Con-
gress cannot bind another. I say that with reference
to the difference between the treaty-making power,
which implies in itself the power to promise something
in the future and to bind the country to it, and the
action of Congress.
This treaty-making power of the United States, I
venture to say, is larger in certain respects than the
treaty-making power of any other country. At least,
if there is any other country in which the same char-
acter attaches to a treaty I do not know it. The con-
stitution says that
"this constitution, the laws passed in pursuance thereof, and the
treaties made under its authority, shall be the supreme law of the
land;"
and, construing that declaration, our court has
decided that a treaty which is in its form of a statutory
character, declaring something in presenti, but not in
promissory form, is a law of the United States. As,
for instance, we made a treaty, as we did, with China,
that certain classes of Chinese might come into the
States. That needed no law to give it effect; it was in
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itself a law enacted by the treaty-making power. And
that has led to what seems. to other countries to be
peculiar-the fact that such a law may be repealed by
subsequent statute, the later declaration of the legis-
lative power controlling. Therefore when we could
not arrange with China to change that treaty, Con-
gress broke the treaty-that is what she did-broke
the treaty and repealed the law of that treaty, the
treaty remaining binding on the Government as an
international matter, but the domestic effect of the
treaty being changed and the provisions of the law
substituted.
And so, too, it has happened that a treaty can
repeal a law, where the treaty is of the character which
I have described. More than that, the treaty-making
power in the United States exceeds that of Congress
in the subject-matters that it may deal with and con-
trol. We deal only through the Federal Government
with other nations. The Federal Government repre-
sents the nation. In treaties of amity and commerce
we often have to deal with matters over which the
States, under polity, exercise control; as for instance
the matter of the descent and distribution of the
estates of deceased persons. Many of the States have
provisions by which aliens are not allowed to take
under certain conditions. The treaty-making power
may by a treaty suspend the operation of a State law
in reference to such distribution and confer by law on
aliens the benefit of such suspension and may put into
a treaty a provision in their behalf. That was decided
in the case of Dufroi v. Riggs by the Supreme Court
of the United States. There the statute of Maryland
denied to a French alien the right of inheritance, the
taking of land under that jurisdiction. A treaty pro-
vided that French aliens should have the right of dis-
tribution, and that suspended the State law as far as
French aliens were concerned.
I instance these two things to show you that, how-
ever much the treaty-making power of the United
States is discussed and minimized, these features indi-
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cate that it was no mean power that was being con-
ferred on the President and two-thirds of the Senate,
when it was reposed in them and not given as well to
the House of Representatives as part of Congress.
Now, in this case the Supreme Court, speaking of the
treaty-making power, used this language-if I may
test your patience-the language of Mr. Justice Field:
"The power is unlimited except by those restraints which are
found in the constitution against the action of the Government or
its departments, and those arising from the nature of the Govern-
ment itself and that of the States. It would not be contended that
it extends so far as to authorize what the constitution forbids, or a
change in the character of the Government or In that of one of the
States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter
(that is, of the State) without its consent. But with. these excep-
tions it is not perceived that there is any limit to the questions
which can be adjusted touching any matter which is properly the
subject of negotiation with a foreign country."
I think you will see that that is pretty wide lan-
guage.
Now, this treaty-making power has been the sub-
ject of contention from the beginning because Con-
gress holds the purse strings and matters of that sort
first come into the House of Representatives. When
the Jay Treaty was made, which was not particularly
popular in the United States, and Congress -was called
upon to appropriate money which the treaty bound us
to pay, Congress passed a resolution asking President
Washington to send the papers concerning the Jay
Treaty to the House, in order that they might judge of
the propriety of this treaty before they paid the money
required by its terms: and President Washington sent
back to them, in deferential words, which he always
used, a very plain intimation that those papers were
none of their business; that this was an obligation of
the United States, plain in its terms, and that there-
fore it was their duty to perform the obligation of the
United States by paying the money provided in the
contract. And with a protest, and a resolution, and a
kick, they paid the money.
So Hamilton; so Jefferson. In other words, the
House has never refused to perform such a require-
ment in a treaty, although you can find resolutions in
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which the House has protested that it ought to have
something to say about the debts to be created, which
it is called upon to 
pay.
Now, with this preliminary declaration, perhaps
too long-but that is one of the defects of the con-sti-
tu-tional lawyer that he is long (laughter)-I come
to the question: what is this Covenant of the League
of Nations? Because in considering its constitutional
validity under our fundamental law it conduces some-
what to clarity of thought to know what we are talk-
ing about.
As I read the Covenant it is not an instrument that
established a government at all. It is a partnership
agreement made up of two kinds of stipulations. The
first kind of stipulation is of those agreements which
are self-restraining covenants, covenants not to do
things likely to lead to war, covenants not to exceed
an agreed limit of armament, which each nation enters
into. A covenant, under Article X, to respect the ter-
ritorial integrity and the independence of every other
member of the League. Under Articles XV and XVI
and earlier articles, a covenant not to begin war on
any difference with another nation, but either to sub-
mit that difference to arbitration or, as a matter of
course, to turn it over to the Executive Council, or if
not that, to the Assembly, and a further covenant not
to begin war until three months after the award or the
recommendation of settlement, as the case may be. Then
an agreement not to make secret treaties, but to put a
provision into treaties that they shall not be binding
until they are spread out for public knowledge in the
registry of the secretariat. Those are the restraining
covenants. Then there are agreements which are
directed towards the penalizing and the enforcement
of those restraining covenants. That is to be done by the
united action of all the other members of the League.
There is no court provided in the Covenant to construe
what that united obligation is, and there is no execu-
tive to enforce that affirmative obligation of the mem-
bers of the League. That is, and must be, left under
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the terms of the Covenant to the conscience and good
faith of the members of the League; not only compli-
ance with the obligation, but the construction of what
the obligation is. I repeat it, there is no court to con-
strue authoritatively; so that any member, in refusing
to take that construction, cannot be deemed to violate
its obligation to construe what that obligation is.
The only two bodies of the League are the Council,
originally called the Executive Council, but improperly
so, and now changed in the final form of the League
because it was improper-the Council and the Assem-
bly; and their duties, with one or two unimportant
exceptions that I have not time to attend to, are only
advisory so far as executive matters are concerned-
only recommendatory. They do sit as quasi-judicial
bodies where arbitration is not resorted to; but to say
that a body which sits as a court constitutes a govern-
ment with executive power is, it seems to me, to per-
vert the ordinary meaning of terms.
Now you say that this does not amount to much as
an organization, if there isn't anything but conscience
and good faith back of those who are to see to it that
the self-restraining covenants are enforced. Well, if
that is so, then it is not a strong document. And it
only recurs to what I said with reference to Lord
Haldane's address, that the strength of the League its
efficiency, must depend on the spirit of co-operation,
the conscientious performance of obligation, in good
faith construed, by those who have assumed it, to make
the League effective, and it does not make any differ-
ence how strong you may make the provisions, unless
you have that, every League will fail. (Applause).
Now, what are the objections on the part of those
in the United States who oppose the League? I am
not going into the merits. Of course those objections
are objections of policy - the chief objections are
objections of policy. The departure from the long-
honoured separation of the United States from Euro-
pean and world politics and matters has made our
people naturally cautious and anxious if possible to
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avoid the burden that must be assumed in taking over
those obligations; and that I don't intend to discuss.
The whole matter is apparently in this present presi-
dential campaign; not so much the constitutional ques-
tion, I think, because the other side, that on the merits,
is more emphasized. Then, too, there are a number
of people who think that it is not in the campaign at
all and that, while the discussion is very extended, the
result of the election is not likely to be regarded, pro-
perly to be regarded, as a decision on that issue and
that, therefore, much as it is talked about, it is not a
real issue in the campaign. That comment may be
affected by future developments in the campaign, to
see whether other issues do not take the place of that
-the League-which for the present seems to be the
most prominent. .But all that I am not going to dis-
cuss at all-whether we ought or ought not to enter
into such a league. But I want to take up, as I said,
the constitutional objections.
The first one is that we change our form of govern-
ment; that we create a super-sovereign, consisting of
the Council or the Assembly, and that we part
with part of our sovereignty to that Council or that
Assembly.
Now, I submit that the Council, with only recom-
mendatory powers, or only powers as a quasi-judicial
tribunal in submitted differences, where it acts neces-
sarily in a quasi-judicial capacity, is not a government
at all. It has not behind it any force. It cannot coin-
mand any force. It recommends. It is an intermedi-
ary body for the purpose of facilitating the agreement
of the powers and their unanimity in action, which
Lord Robert Cecil said was the basis of the form that
the Covenant had taken. They are only intermediaries.
They exercise no direct power themselves. The deci-
sions as to what is to be done by those -who are to exe-
cute the purpose of the treaty must be made by the
nations themselves, according to their own constitu-
tional authority.
One remark about sovereignty. It is said that we
part with our sovereignty when we promise to make
1.9201 1035
HeinOnline  -- 40 Can. L. Times 1033 1920
6THE CANADIAN LAW TIMES.
way, promise to go into a boycott, promise to limit our
army. Well, I venture to dispute that proposition. Of
course the making of war is an evidence of sovereignty.
Of course the making of a law is. But to promise to do
one thing which does not sum up the faculties of sov-
ereignty-to do one thing in the future-is not to part
with sovereignty. The truth is that a sovereign that
cannot agree with other nations to do something is not
a sovereign at all. It is a nation that ought to go into
a guardianship. (Applause.) A minor who cannot
contract a debt that will bind him is not ordinarily
regarded as a full power. Now I do not mean to say
that you might not promise to do so many things that
you really do interfere with and obstruct your sover-
eignty. If the promise covers a great many subjects,
then it becomes a matter of degree. But all nations
promise to do things. All nations must promise to do
things, in order that there shall be any international
relations at all.
Take the analogy of a free man. Does he lose his
liberty when he promises to render service of a month
or a year to another ? He binds himself. The law will
not enforce it. The element of sovereignty is that
power to break a contract as well as to make it. Now
you cannot enforce a year's contract of service against
a free man. I do not mean to say that there are not
some exceptions in this respect, but generally in law a
man who makes a contract of service can break it and
your only remedy is damages. If you could keep him
going for a year, you have transgressed the line that
ordinarily determines freedom and liberty and you
have introduced an element of slavery. Certainly we
have said so in our country, under the thirteenth
amendment, that where you have a contract by which
you can compel a man and punish him for not perform-
ing his contrat of service, you have violated the thii-
teenth amendment. And congressional legislation to
that effect is on our statute books. And so a sover-
eign may make a contract, but it is a little like fore-
ordination and free will. The power to do right or to
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do wron'g is the element of sovereignty, as it is the ele-
ment of liberty, and creates responsibility and the
sense of it. It is not correct, therefore, to say that this
takes away our sovereignty because we agree to do
something in the future with reference to war, with
reference to armament.
Then it is said it changes our form of government.
Why? It is said the power to make war is vested by
the constitution in Congress; Congress may declare
war, Congress may carry it on; therefore, when the
treaty-making power agrees that the Government shall
make war, it is taking away the power of Congress to
determine in its discretion, when the occasion arises,
whether that war shall be made.
Well, what is the answer? The answer is that it
does not take away the power. It merely imposes the
obligation, so that the action of Congress in not mak-
ing war is a breach of its contract, but it does not take
away the power of Congress either to make or not to
make war.
In other words, gentlemen, the treaty-making power
is the promising power of the government; and when
we make a promise of that sort, the treaty-making
power is the government. Congress is the performing
power of the government, and, therefore, when we come
to perform, Congress is the government; and if Con-
gress does not perform the promises made by the gov-
ernment, when it makes them through its constitu-
tional agency to promise, then it breaks its promise,
that is all. And there is nothing in the promise that
in any way curtails or cuts down the discretion vested
in Congress by the constitution to declare or make
war.
It is the same way with reference to declaring an
embargo necessary to declare the universal boycott
that under the sixteenth article of the League is the
penalty visited against those who fail to keep their
covenants to submit differences and to delay war
until three months after the recommendation or deci-
sion is made.
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The point has been made a good many times, and
been urged, that by promising to make war or not to
make war, the treaty-making power is taking some-
thing away from Congress. Now, I say there is noth-
ing in it whatever, and that when you see the distinc-
tion between the government in promising, and the
government through a different agency in perform-
ing, you can see that the government is the same; the
government has made the promise and the government
has the power, though not the moral or indeed the
legal right, to violate that promise. Nevertheless, it
has the power, and that is what makes sovereignty,
and that is what makes the actual functioning power
of a branch of the government.
This is proven by the construction put upon that
power for a number of years, ever since the beginning.
Why, the argument has gone so far as that we cannot
agree to arbitrate anything which shall result in an
obligation on the part of Congress to perform what
that arbitration is, because it takes away the power of
Congress. Now, is it necessary to answer an argu-
ment like that? I do not want to take away from the
credit of Great Britain or of Canada in the matter of
arbitrations, but I venture to say we more than any
other country in the world have resorted to arbitra-
tion and sought arbitration whenever we could. And
for a hundred years. Why, the first treaty that we
made with Great Britain, the Jay Treaty, contains a
provision for arbitration and we have had it in all our
treaties ever since. Now, if it be true that to arbi-
trate is to submit something that may control Con-
gress and therefore take away from its power to act,
then we would have no right to arbitrate anything.
And so to make war; so to guarantee independence.
We have now a treaty made with Panama by which
we guarantee her independence and the integrity of
her territory. That is nothing but the same obliga-
tion entered into in Article X. Nobody has ever said
that that treaty was wrong. We had got something
for it. We got -our treaty with Panama, which
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enabled us to build the Panama Canal. And can we
back out of that on the ground that it ousted the
power of Congress with reference to the making of
war!
When you come to resort to precedent you find not
only that, but the Bryan treaties, of which there were
some twenty, I think, or twenty-three-I don't know
how many-which provide that no nation under those
treaties shall go to war until a year after the event
leading to the war and until after investigation and
report shall be made. Now that limits the power of
Congress to declare war, for a year; and if it does, it
ousts its power to declare war-if that be true, if that
is the theory. So that precedent is entirely at vari-
ance with any such proposition.
You see the reductio ad absurdum that you have.
Congress is the only power under the constitution
that can pay money out of the Treasury of the United
States. If that be true, if this view be true that we can-
not agree to do anything that Congress is the constitu-
tional agency in doing, then we of the United States
cannot agree to pay another nation any money in the
future. We can back out of every contract. We did
agree to pay twenty millions for the Philippines and
we paid it. We agreed to pay such an award as might
be made in the Fisheries Arbitration; and you found
that we had taken fish-or the arbitration found that
we had taken fish to the extent of five millions. We
did not like it, we made grimaces, just as you did over
the Geneva arbitration, but we paid the money, and
we did not attempt to get out of it on the theory that it
took away the power of Congress to use its independ-
ent discretion in paying money. It did not do any
such thing. It only left to Congress the power to
decide whether we ought to pay our debts, or ought
not to,-that is all.
In this way it seems to me-I have covered the chief
objections on any constitutional ground to the entry
of the United States into such a treaty as that pro-
posed. The constitutional decisions as to the charac-
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ter of our government written by Chief Justice Mar-
shall are illuminating and convincing as to the charac-
ter of the nation which was created by the constitu-
tion. Whatever the merits of this particular League
may be, it would be a great interference with the use-
fulness of the government of the United States for the
people of the United States, on the one hand, and for
the neighbours of the United States, and the world-
for all the world is her neighbour now-if the United
States might not enter into obligations of an affirma-
tive character to do certain things in consideration
of other nations doing either the same thing or a thing
of some other nature. And I do not think those people
who contend against the power of the United States to
make such a contract fully realize how completely such
a construction of *the constitution would relegate our
great nation and our great government, the power of
which Marshall and the whole court have always
exalted, would relegate that government and nation
to the limbo of infants and of persons irresponsible,
so that they may not make obligations that shall be
binding on them. (Great applause.)
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